



Economic Mobilization for National Defence. by A. N. Agarwala

Review by: Leonard H. Rushfield

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Book Reviews

would most probably jeopardize national development; and if that occurred, the security of India could be threatened by developments no less ominous than Chinese expansionism. India, the author concludes, "must learn to live with insecurity." This is the inescapable, if unpleasant, reality that has to guide Indian and Western strategists alike in their efforts to preserve peace and stability in one of the most crucial regions in international affairs.

Vassar College

CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE. By A. N. Agarwala. New York: Asia Publishing House. 1966. 126 pp. \$3.00.

CONCERNED WITH THE shortcomings of India's defense effort, Dr. A. N. Agarwala of the University of Allahabad seeks to demonstrate that the country has the resources to support a massive expansion of its military forces. He offers a model of the Indian economy, noting the points at which more funds can be found. His concern is legitimate: India has a chronic deficit of resources to meet a bewildering number of problems, including defense. However, Dr. Agarwala's model offers little of value, either as an analysis of the country's plight or as a plan for action.

In economic terms the model is complicated but not especially sophisticated. Some rather dubious assumptions are offered. First, that a subsistence economy contains a great pool of untapped private resources which can easily be put to public use. Second, that the resources which are available can be used to advantage in mobilizing for defense. Dr. Agarwala demonstrates the obvious. He shows that India has a very large economic base corresponding to its huge population. But he does not adequately demonstrate that resources can be raised and used in support of a massive military effort.

Dr. Agarwala becomes very vulnerable when he leaves his specialty, economics, to offer judgments about military policy and practical politics. He assumes that the conflicts with China and Pakistan pose the immediate and direct threats to national survival. On this assumption, he then believes that the Indian people and government will want to make extreme sacrifices for defense. Published in 1966, the book's assumptions have already failed the test of time.

Economic Mobilization for National Defence is useful as a document testifying to the anxiety which prevails in India over the country's military difficulties. Dr. Agarwala's concern and confusion reflect those of a nation caught with an awesome gap between expectations and responsibilities on one hand, and resources and capabilities on the other.

Columbia University

LEONARD H. RUSHFIELD